### SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

REV:10/29/87 SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT FMEA NO 06-2F -371000-1

SSEMBLY .FIRE SUPPRESSION CRIT. FUNC: 1 R :V070-623411-001 & -002 CRIT. HDW: P/N RI

VEHICLE 102 104 P/N VENDOR: FSN 4210-00-555-8837 103

EFFECTIVITY: х ¥ X **YTITHAUQ** 

PHASE(S): PL X LO oo x do ls x :ONE ON FLIGHT DECK

:TWO ON MID-DECK

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-FAIL B-N/A C-PASS

SSM HARTER APPROVED\_BY PREPARED BY: DES JE Thetank D. WADA DES - REL 250 %... D. RISING REL

Jana - 12 Men 11357 QΕ QΞ W. SMITH QΕ

ITEM:

PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER

### FUNCTION:

TO PROVIDE FIRE SUPPRESSANT IN THE FLIGHT DECK, MIDDECK, AND AIRLOCK AREAS. TO PROVIDE FIRE SUPPRESSANT FOR FLIGHT AND MIDDECK PANELS. TO PROVIDE BACKUP FIRE SUPPRESSANT FOR THE CABIN AVIONICS BAYS.

#### FAILURE MODE:

FAILS TO OPERATE (JAMMED ACTUATOR)

## ~'USE(S):

ONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

### EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERPACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A) LOSS OF ONE OF THREE PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS.
- (B,C,D) NO EFFECT
- (E) LOSS OF ALL THREE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS CAN CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF COMBUSTION IS SUPPORTED IN THE CABIN. REDUNDANCY SCREEN & FAILS BECAUSE PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER CAN NOT BE VERIFIED WITHOUT EXPELLING SUPPRESSANT.

### DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

### (A) DESIGN

OFF THE SHELF ITEM SINCE 1963 MADE TO U.S.ARMY MIL-SPEC (MIL-E-52031D). ALL MATERIAL'S USED ARE COMPATIBLE WITH HALON 1301. STAINLESS STEEL CYLINDER. ANODIZED ALUMINUM, BRASS PLUG AND SEAL, NICKEL PLATED BRASS VALVE STEM, TEFLON NON-METALLICS. SAFETY PIN AND BURST DISC.

### (B) TEST

25 FT-LB TORQUE; LEAK <0.1 OZ./YEAR; VIBRATION-60CPS AT 1.25G FOR ONE HOUR PER AXIS; FOUR FOOT DROP TEST ON CONCRETE/3 AXIS; LOW TEMP. TEST AT 50 DEG F AND PRESSURIZED AT 1025 PSIA FOR 12 HOURS; SALT SPRAY TEST; ) LB LOAD AT 1120 PSIA TEST ON THE SAFETY PIN.

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TURNAROUND: VISUAL INSPECTION FOR DAMAGE EVERY FLIGHT.

### (C) INSPECTION

RECEIVING INSPECTION
RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

### CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CORROSION PROTECTION, CONTAMINATION CONTROL, CLEANING, AND CLEANLINESS LEVEL ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

### ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

MANUFACTURING PROCESSES, INSTALLATION, AND ASSEMBLY ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. VERIFY DIMENSIONS AND INSTALLATION OF SPECIAL NOZZLE. PARTS PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

### HANDLING/PACKAGING

HANDLING AT SUPPLIER AND PACKAGING FOR SHIFMENT IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

# (D) FAILURE HISTORY

MATURE HARDWARE. NO APPLICABLE FAILURE HISTORY.

### (E) OPERATIONAL USE

USE ANOTHER FORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER.